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Abstract: Free/libre  or  open-source  software  (FLOSS)  is  nowadays  produced  not  only  by  individual  
benevolent developers but, in a growing proportion, by firms that hire programmers for their own objectives 
of  development  in  open source or  for  contributing  to  open-source projects  in  the context  of  dedicated  
communities. A recent literature has focused on the question of the business models explaining how and why 
firms may draw benefits from such involvement and their connected activities. They can be considered as  
the building blocks of a new modus operandi of an industry, built on an alternative approach to intellectual  
property management. Its prospects will depend on both the firms' willingness to rally and its ability to  
compete with the traditional “proprietary” approach. As a matter of fact, firms' involvement in FLOSS,  
while growing, remains very contrasting, depending on the nature of the products and the characteristics of  
the markets. The aim of this paper is to emphasize that, beside factors like the importance of software as a  
core competence of the firm, the role of users on the related markets - and more precisely their level of  
skills - may provide a major explanation of such diversity. We introduce the concept of the dominant skilled 
user and we set up a theoretical model to better understand how it may condition the nature and outcome of  
the competition between a FLOSS firm and a proprietary firm. We discuss these results  in the light  of  
empirical stylized facts drawn from the recent trends in the software industry.
1. Introduction  
“Free/libre or open-source software” (FLOSS) is software whose source-code, that is the explicit expression 
of the programming work, remains openly accessible. Until recently, FLOSS was considered only to be of 
interest to programmers motivated by the building and sharing of a base of programs developed for their own 
needs (Lakhani & von Hippel (2003), Demazière & al. (2006)). 
Today, open source software is increasingly integrated into many commercial offers (Novell, buying Ximian 
and SuSE, Sun open-sourcing its operating system, IBM open-sourcing its development tool software Eclipse, 
even Microsoft, which recently decided to distribute some of its software products under open license1). So 
Iansiti & Richards (2006) identify, amongst the various FLOSS projects, a “money-driven cluster” where “IT 
vendors’ motives are economic. In this cluster, significant investments have been made in projects that will 
serve as complementary assets to drive revenues to vendors’ core businesses”.
*The authors thank warmly the two anonymous referees for their  excellent reports and suggestions and the EMR editors for the  
very accurate advice they gave us for the improvement of the paper. We  are also indebted for helpful comments to the participants 
of the Conferences and seminars where we had the opportunity to present the project of this paper, more particularly the  DIME 
London Conference “Intellectual Property Rights for Business and Society”, Birkbeck University, 14th and 15th September 2006, the 
international  conference  “The  diffusion  of FLOSS and  the  Organization  of the  Software  Industry:  From Social  Networks  to 
Economic and Legal Models”, Nice Sophia-Antipolis, May 31st, June 1st 2007, the Complex Markets Workshop, Warwick Business 
School, 31 March - 2 April 2008. This research has benefited from the support of the Institut Telecom (France), the French ANR 
and the European STREP “Complex Markets”.
1 http://solutions.journaldunet.com/0404/040407_microsoft.shtml
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Lakhani and Wolf (2005),  analyzing the results  of a  survey of 684 software developers involved in 287 
FLOSS  projects,  show that  “a  majority of  (their)  respondents  are  skilled and  experienced professionals 
working in IT-related jobs, with approximately 40 percent being paid to participate in the FLOSS project”. 
This situation, in which commercial business relies on the existence and durability of non-market activities, 
challenges traditional industrial economic theory. 
As in any cooperative agreement devoted to technology or knowledge development, agents pool assets together 
in a “pre-competitive” phase and share the products of their efforts before returning to competition (Crémer et 
al.  (1990),  Bhattacharya  and Guriev (2006)).  But such agreements remain closed to third parties. On the 
contrary, a FLOSS project is an open contribution game in which the list of players is not bounded ex-ante by 
a cooperative agreement and the output of which is a public good that cannot be appropriated by any of the 
players in an exclusive way. This corresponds more to the formation of a consortium for the production of a 
standard2.
In line with the seminal work of Teece (1986),  FLOSS  can be considered as  an extreme case of “open 
innovation” (Chesbrough 2003), defined as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external 
ideas as  well as  internal ideas,  and internal and external paths  to market,  as  they look to advance their 
technology”  (Chesbrough,  2006).  Dahlander  and  Wallin  (2006)  show  that  firms  strategically  sponsor 
individuals who occupy a central position in a community, in order to better access distributed skills and to 
control the direction of development of the related projects. Those firms seem to consider communities as “a 
complementary asset that exists outside firm boundaries and outside their ownership or hierarchical control”. 
This is even the sole control means when innovations, as observed by Von Hippel (2005), are produced by a 
community of  innovative users  that  protect  their  innovation from private  appropriation  through a  GPL 
license3. 
But things often stand differently. There exists a large variety of licenses that have been designed to achieve 
the co-existence of open source principles with private interests (Muselli, 2002, West 2003). But even in the 
case of GPL protection, intellectual property is not always shared among the members of a community. So, the 
database software MySQL is entirely owned by the eponymous firm4. Yet it has published its products under 
GPL license, thus abandoning any monopoly rent on them but allowing a free access for users and potential 
competitors.
So this is a radically brand new way of producing software that has emerged and become widespread during 
this last decade. It challenges the foundations and competition regime of the software industry,  which was 
evolving more towards strengthening intellectual property protection (Bessen and Hunt, 2007). Two radically 
opposed ways of working are confronting each other, based on two opposing views about intellectual property 
management.  On the one hand, the “traditional” position, referred to here as  the “proprietary”  approach, 
defends the need to strengthen the intellectual property regime to respond to a  growing ease with which 
software codes can be appropriated and used without any fee5. FLOSS defenders, on the other hand, argue that 
that position is inefficient for innovation dynamics, reinforcing the market power of the sole dominant firms 
and  thus  the  oligopolistic  nature  of  the  industry,  which is  economically inefficient6.  The  result  of  this 
confrontation is then of huge importance for the future of the software industry and, more widely, for the 
whole information and communication industry. From an even broader perspective, this case of open-source 
2 What we mean is that a player offers a standard by developing software that the other players can adopt and help to develop. This 
“unilateral” adoption is usually called ‘bandwagon’ in the literature on standards (see, for instance, Farrell and Saloner, 1985). 
3The  main  principle  of the GPL (General  Public  License)  is  to  make  its  adopters  disclose  the  source-code  of the  programs 
concerned and of any further improvement if they circulate them, as well as the free circulation of the code under the sole condition 
of maintaining its "open" character. 
4 This means that any developer wanting to make a contribution to the official MySQL product has to transfer her copyright to 
MySQL.  http://forge.mysql.com/contribute/cla.php.  Once  owning  the  whole  copyright,  the  firm  can  manage  a  dual  licensing 
scheme,  distributing the product under  the license it  wants,  either  GPL or a more classical  closed license.  So a customer that 
wishes not to reveal further enhancements of the source code has to pay for a closed license.
5 See the arguments developed by the Business Software Alliance (BSA), which regroups the main actors of the software sector, 
such  as  IBM,  Microsoft,  Apple,  Sybase,  etc.  on  http://www.bsa.org/,  especially  their  latest  white  paper  (August  2008, 
http://www.bsa.org/country/Research%20and%20Statistics/~/media/96FC7EAFF3E84436AF62C3B393F207B1.ashx).
6 See the arguments of the Free Software Foundation (http://www.fsf.org), or Boldrin and Levine (2007).
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software can be viewed as a precursor of what could also take place in a wider array of industries where 
innovation has a strong role to play in competition and requires to access to a larger and larger range of 
knowledge and resources.
The outcome of this situation clearly depends both on the capability of software firms involved in FLOSS to 
set up business models likely to compete efficiently with those defending the “proprietary” position and on the 
inclination of firms incorporating software in their products either to consider FLOSS as an effective resource 
or even to support or contribute to their development. Currently, attitudes towards FLOSS appear to vary 
strongly according to the sectors of activities of what we shall refer as the information technology industry (IT 
industry in short).
The aim of this paper is to show that, beside factors like the importance of software as a core competence of 
the firm, one major explanation of such diversity can be found in the characterization of the users’ skills 
according to the markets involved. In order to better understand this aspect, we introduce the concept of the 
dominant skilled user and we build a small competition model in which two firms, a proprietary one and a 
FLOSS one, choose their level of investment - and thus of product quality - and compete for market share. We 
show that the level of skill of the dominant users deeply conditions the nature and issue of the competition, as 
we shall illustrate through empirical stylised facts.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we describe the structure of the IT industry and the variety of 
firms' attitude toward FLOSS.  In section 3, we introduce the concept of the dominant skilled user and we 
present a formal competition model in which two firms, one open source and one proprietary, compete for a 
market  characterised by  a  given distribution of  users'  skills.  Section 4  provides  a  descriptive/empirical 
discussion of the application to FLOSS. Then we conclude. 
2. The structure of the IT industry and the variety of attitudes   
toward FLOSS
There is a wide diversity of actors in the industry in terms of both products and size. Successive waves of 
innovations  and  company strategies  have  led to  a  progressive reshaping  of  the  industry’s  borders  and 
structure.  However,  the foundations  of  the industry have remained unchanged,  since those described by 
Gérard-Varet & Zimmermann (1985), Zimmermann (1995) and Steinmueller (1996): IT products are built by 
assembling hardware and software units in a given architecture, and these products (isolated or integrated into 
networks) are used as parts of information systems and solutions. On the basis of such technical organization, 
it is then possible to distinguish three large types of “vertical specialization”: i) component producers; ii) 
computers and IT devices suppliers; iii) software editors and service companies providing applications.
The basic conditions for each kind of activity (characteristics of the products,  of the users,  hence of the 
demand) that shape the main aspects of the market structure have been extensively described in the literature 
(Genthon, 1995, Dréan 1996, Steinmueller, 1996). They help to explain the sources of competitive advantage 
and the conditions for a newcomer to enter a market, or for an incumbent firm to improve its market share.
i) Component producers supply the basic components of electronic devices like chips (Intel, Toshiba), hard 
disks or  cards  (ATI:  graphic cards).  The quality and performance of the main components built  into an 
electronic device are, to an ever-increasing extent, considered as a critical feature of the performance of the 
product. 
ii) Using these components, firms build machines more or less dedicated to specific uses. At one extreme, 
computers can be used for a  wide scope of applications, depending on the software that  is acquired and 
installed on them. At the other extreme, video game consoles or multimedia players are devoted to a single 
range of applications, while in between, mobile devices like PDAs or mobile phones are built to support a 
growing number of applications7. 
7 This distinction between specialized and generalist devices is evolving, as Sony intends its PS3 to be the media center at home. 
But so far, this has not impacted on the industrial structure.
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−Servers  are  designed to manage,  deliver and protect  information on the networks.  They must  be high-
performance, stable, but also compatible with network standards. An archetype of server producers is SUN.
−Microcomputers (with a  growing market share for  laptop computers)  are used by end users,  mainly as 
personal computers. In order to clarify the analysis, we have split this segment into the two categories of “high  
quality computers” - HQC - targeted at  organizations or intensive end-users8 and “low price computers” 
-LPC -, targeted at basic uses (Internet, for instance) and low-skilled users. Market structures and actors are 
dissimilar, even if some of the suppliers sell on both markets by differentiating their product ranges, in order to 
draw benefits from increased scale and scope economies. This appears quite similar to other industries like the 
automobile industry, where top- and bottom-of-the-range markets do not work similarly but can be partly held 
by the same manufacturers. An archetype of a “quality computers” supplier could be Dell or Toshiba, while 
an archetype of a “low price computer” could be Acer or Packard Bell.
−Dedicated machines such as PDAs, multimedia players, mobile phones, etc. are more and more present in 
information systems networking. Most of these devices are connected to the computer(s), but more and more 
also have access to the Internet (via Wifi, local networks or ADSL technologies), and share applications with 
the  computer  (e-mail,  personal  data  management,  etc.)  Even devices  such  as  video game consoles  are 
increasingly connected to an Internet-based network. Archetypes of this evolution are Nokia's mobile phone, 
Nintendo's game console, Apple's music player (Ipod) or Palm's PDA. 
iii)  Since the beginning of the 1970s,  some firms have specialized in software production and,  since the 
beginning of the 1980s, in software publishing (packaged software). Three typical strategic orientations can be 
described that have successively emerged in two waves. These three strategic options gave rise to a market 
segmentation that corresponds to different degrees of user sensibility to price, variety and specificity of the 
offer. 
The “packaged software” business solution providers: First, during the 1980s and 1990s, a growing 
number  of  users  sought  to  reduce  the  costs  and  uncertainty related  to  customized development  by 
acquiring software packages that could installed and adapted to their specific needs and constraints, with 
the help of service enterprises accredited by the software editor (Horn 2004, p. 98). These hybrid offers of 
“packages”, combining standardized goods and customized services, were highly successful in the field of 
professional  dedicated solutions,  both  for  management  needs (ERP  such  as  SAP)  and  for  technical 
software (middleware applications, compilers, development tools like those from Ilog) or branch-specific 
applications  (like  software  for  computer-assisted  design  or  computer-assisted  manufacturing  from 
Dassault System or others).
With the development of networks within firms and, more recently, outside, with the diffusion of the Internet, a 
growing number of heterogeneous users have shared a growing number of applications (mainly those allowing 
information exchange and sharing). This network effect and the related need for standardization have had 
important consequences on further technological orientation. It was necessary to ensure the availability of a 
wide portfolio of software tools that could meet the needs of all these, both for expert and for unskilled users, 
within common or separate organizations. Two kinds of strategies can be observed as  responding to this 
necessity:
The platform producers: On the one hand, software publishers have broadened the scope of their offer 
by supplying a variety of application tools that can be combined with their core product or by supplying 
this latter  in multiple versions. This enables them to better meet users’ specific needs while keeping 
production costs down. The archetypal example of such a “platform strategy” is Microsoft, which now 
offers different versions of its operating system for servers, corporate users or private individuals, as does 
its open-source competitor RedHat now. The same kind of strategy can be observed for Oracle, which 
sells professional applications developed on its database technology, and which has recently bought BEA, 
8 People playing games, watching video films on their computer or using it for high performance professional purposes.
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after other takeovers, to enlarge its applications portfolio9. Another illustration is given by Symbian in the 
field of operating systems (OS) for mobile applications.
The architects: On the other hand, service companies, especially the large ones, such as IBM and Cap 
Gemini, have tried to master a wide range of software technologies and products they can combine and 
adapt to the constraints and the existing equipment of their customers. They intervene as “architects” of 
their  customers’  information systems.  Smaller  local  services companies have a  similar  position,  also 
providing infrastructure services but at a smaller scale (single server maintenance instead of a large IT 
infrastructure) or aimed at specific professional needs (like IT infrastructure maintenance services in the 
food industry).
All these segments are characterized by strong imperfect competition regimes due to diverse increasing return 
effects (economies of scale in production, high sunk costs – R&D, distribution channels, etc. -, technological 
interrelatedness and learning). One single segment (the platform market,  when looking at  the OS for PC 
computers market) can be considered as a quasi-monopoly with very high barriers to entry, controlled by a 
dominant leader (Microsoft, Oracle) that intends to use this dominant position in order to extend its dominance 
over related application tools (See, for example, Gartner for a description of the database market and its level 
of concentration10).
In such oligopolies, differentiation strategies generally play an important role. In the sole segment of low-price 
computers, where competition is mainly based on prices, the strategies are based on the exploitation of new 
market  potential  through vertical  differentiation with  the  traditional  PC  market.  In  the  other  segments, 
strategies are rather of horizontal differentiation, either related to the integration of new features and high 
performance tools or to market segmentation through hard-soft-content bundling (mainly based on proprietary 
standards).
So new entries require either better performance/cost ratios (for instance lower price computers or  better 
computational capacities for servers or high-quality computers) or innovative horizontal differentiation (e.g. 
new features in personal communication tools or business software). 
Last  but  not least,  horizontal differentiation can also target a  sub-group of users with specific needs not 
fulfilled by the existing offer, as Samsung did when proposing a fold display mobile phone. This is also a 
possible strategy in the business software market (to propose a targeted offer at the best possible price to a 
“niche” market).
Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of commercial firms, both new entrants and incumbents, have decided 
to integrate FLOSS products into their own specific offer or toolboxes, even investing by different means in 
FLOSS development. Of course, these new emerging strategies must  be understood in the light of the IP 
protection practices prevailing in each market segment and the need to strengthen competitive advantages or to 
rely on new ones. 
Regarding the degree of involvement in FLOSS dynamics, the most active actors seems to be found in sectors 
where software development and use is either a core activity or a crucial condition for performances, as is the 
case for server manufacturers or architects (e.g. the adoption of Linux by IBM and HP since the beginning of 
the 2000s). At the other extreme, the weakest involvement is found amongst hardware suppliers that can only 
feel concerned by FLOSS for compatibility and price purposes.
When FLOSS adoption is related to marginal aspects of differentiation, it seems to have little impact  on 
industrial structure and competition. This is generally the case for most hardware producers, when hard-soft-
content is no longer bundled (servers, computers, PCTs, DVD and MP3 players, etc.) 
9 “Ellison saw that if Oracle played its cards right, the confluence of the database, the Internet, and the Web browser could displace  
the operating system as the focal point of computing and erode Microsoft's industry dominance”. Brent Schlender, CNN Money, 
1999. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1999/05/24/260276/index.htm
10 http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=507466
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Regarding software firms, their core competences have evolved and shifted significantly. Their main challenge 
is less and less to supply a “software solution” to a given problem at a given time, but increasingly to deal 
with short to long term uncertainty over IT system production and management. Users ask for solutions to 
protect them against uncertainty, granting interoperability, bug resolution, the satisfaction of new needs and 
the integration of technical advances. The trade-off between available solutions is not posed in terms of their 
cost of acquisition but of their “TCO” (total cost of ownership), in which the future costs and the costs for 
granting interoperability and adaptability have to be estimated. This is precisely what architects, business 
programs and platform producers sell to skilled users, aware of these problems and signals. On these markets 
the FLOSS organization seems to represent an asset for producers, who can display their involvement and 
succeed in  building sustainable  business  models  (see the  examples  of  RedHat,  MySQL  or,  in  France, 
Linagora). But, as explained before, this is only an asset if the market regards FLOSS as providing a value-
added to the product, i.e. if it brings the users a potential for increasing their utility. 
To a large extent, the differing degrees of involvement in FLOSS between different firms can be explained by 
the position of software in the firm's business model (as core activity or not, see Dahlander and Magnusson, 
2005) but also by the role played by skilled users in the selection of the offers on the market. If the first aspect 
is  clearly  connected to a  well-developed recent literature,  the second remains rather  new and relatively 
unexplored. From that stems the need to better understand the role of the users and the way it may impact the 
firm's ability to achieve a viable business activity capable of competing efficiently with proprietary software 
firms. 
To  this  end,  we introduce in the next  section the notion of the dominant  user's  skill and we present  a 
theoretical  competition model in which two firms  with contrasting attitudes  toward intellectual  property 
protection compete on a market characterized by a given distribution of users' skills. We will see how this 
distribution may drive both the nature (price vs quality) and the outcome (market shares and profit levels) of 
the competition. For this purpose we shall give a formal conceptual base to the notion of dominant user's skill.
3. A competition model with customer feedback  
The users, understood as the persons choosing the solution (thus not always being the “end-users”), are rather 
different from one market to another, causing the competitive advantage to rely on different features. 
Let  us  distinguish between three main types  of  users  according to  their  relation to  the product  and the 
technology (Zimmermann 1995, Kogut and Metiu 2001, Von Hippel 1988, 2002). The first is the category of 
“Naïve customers or users” (that we denote N) who are not endowed with noticeable technical skills and do 
not  individually  weigh  very  much  in  economic  terms.  The  second  is  the  category  of  “Kogut-Metiu 
Users” (KM)11 who are not able to contribute to software development but  can generate new features or 
innovations by revealing their own needs. Above all, they represent an irreplaceable testing and debugging 
base. KM users are sensitive to price and quality arguments. The third category is that of the “Von Hippel 
Users”  (VH)  who  act  as  “sources  of  innovation”  (Von  Hippel,  1988)  able  to  contribute  to  software 
development by proposing improvements or  modifications, developing it by themselves or at  least able to 
design the technical specifications.
Users play a double role, deriving from both their economic and technical standing. Depending on the market, 
and especially their bargaining power in it, the users are more or less able to select the (technical) offers. At 
one extreme, users and contracts in the global service/architects market are related to large structures, with 
substantial buying capacities and generally endowed with significant technical skills. So they are likely to 
influence economic and technical choices. At the other extreme low price computers address a mass market 
where individual users, in their vast majority have little budget and/or few skills. Their influence on market 
evolution is negligible at an individual level but of global importance in terms of elasticity to prices. So, even 
if they are VH or KM types, individual users in such a market can hardly make their views heard (in terms of 
technical  choice,  for  instance).  But  this  analysis  should be nuanced in the case  of  intermediation by a 
“prescriber”, who orders and defines the characteristics for a large number of machines destined for mass 
11 In reference to the notion of “frontier-users” put forward by Kogut and Metiu (2001)
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distribution by his own means (local government for secondary schools in France12, education in rural areas in 
developing countries13, etc.) That's the reason why, when speaking about the “user”, we mean the person who 
negotiates or chooses the characteristics of the good, who is not always the end user.
Of course, different types of users co-exist in any given market.  But the dispersion of users’ skills in the 
related technology and more particularly in software doesn't follow the same distribution from one segment to 
another. Our aim here is to characterize this distribution under the assumption that it usually takes a unimodal 
shape, meaning that most of the users in the market segment are concentrated around a given level of skill, 
corresponding to what we call the dominant user's skill.
In this model presented below, we consider a competition game between a proprietary and an open-source 
software supplier on a market characterized by a given distribution of users' skills.
The users
In a pretty standard way, we consider each individual user to be characterized by a given level of preference 
for quality θ ∈ [0,1]14. In terms of the problem addressed here, this level can be considered as a good proxy of 
the individual user's skill: information technology products are endowed with a wide usage potential that is 
actually exploited more or less fully, according to the user’s ability. This ability is tightly correlated with the 
user's level of skill in computing: the more skilled, the more he is able to benefit from the technical quality of 
the product.15
So for a user of level θ , the utility obtained from a product of quality s sold at price p can be written as
U= θ s – p if he buys the product;
   = 0 otherwise.
It is considered that the weight of the user population is normalized to 1.
A given market is then characterized by the distribution of preferences given by a function
f: [0,1] → R+ : ∫
٠
١
f d =١ (1)
The suppliers
Let l denote the open-source firm and m the proprietary firm.
Both sell a substitutable product vertically differentiated through a quality level s > 0.
The proprietary firm chooses the quality level of its product between a low and a high level
sm ∈ {sL , sH} with 0 < sL < sH
It has to pay a fixed cost 
cm ∈ {cL , cH} with 0 < cL < cH
The open-source firm and the users' feedback effects
12 With the aim to provide “a computer for each pupil”: http://www.ordina13.com/, http://www.ordi35.fr/
13 See,  for  instance,  the  competition  between  Microsoft  and  Mandriva  to  supply  17,000  computers  in  Nigeria.  
http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/government-law/public-sector/news/index.cfm?newsid=6124
14See Tirole J. (1988), Chapter 2.
15See for instance Blili, Raymond and Rivard (1998)
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The quality sl of the product delivered by the open-source firm depends on both the level of contribution cl of l 
to its development and the amount of the feedback effects from its user base, so that
sl = q (cl  , τl) (2)
where τl   is the users' feedback effect, measured as the aggregated skill level of the user base for the open-
source product;
l=∫
l
 f d  (3)
where Θl  is the user base of l , assumed to be compact.
q is assumed to be twice differentiable increasing and quasi-concave in  cl  and τl   and q(0,.) = sd  where sd is 
the standard quality of the product as freely available on Internet.
A simple expression of q is given as linear in cl  and τl   by
sl = λ cl  (1+ τl ) (4)
so that sd = 0 in so far as when it invests 0,  l can only sell what it takes from the community and doesn't 
provide any added value in terms of interface, adaptation or services that could justify a positive price pl  > 0 .
In order to avoid a trivial situation, λ is assumed to have a value such that the open-source firm needs to invest 
more than the proprietary firm to reach the same levels of quality sL < sH , so that
λ < Min (sL / cL , sH / cH ) (5)
Proposition 1:  At the equilibrium,
if sl < sm then for any user of level θ choosing the open-source software, ∀ θ' < θ , θ' then chooses open-
source software
if sl > sm then for any user of level θ choosing the open-source software, ∀ θ' > θ , θ' then chooses open-
source software
The proof of proposition 1 is given in the appendix.
Corollary:
Let  denote the value of θ at which a user has no preference between l and m
=
p m− pl
sm−s l
(6)
and θ0 the minimal level of the users entering the market.
When sl < sm , ٠=
p l
s l
 then   Θl  = [θ0 ,  ]  and  Θm  = [  , 1]
When sm < sl , ٠=
pm
sm
 then   Θl  = [  , 1]  and  Θlm = [θ0 ,  ]
The game:
m chooses to invest cm = cL resp. cH  for a quality sm = sL resp. sH  and sets its market price  pm
l invests  cl and gets a quality level sl  at price pl , with sl  either lower or greater than  sm .
Respective profits can be written Πm = pm Θm− cm  and Πl = pl Θl− cl   as defined above.
So the game is the following:
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m       l <  sm >  sm
sL ΠmL , ΠlL ΠmḸ , ΠlḸ 
sH ΠmH , ΠlH Πm , Πl
The reasoning is backward:
If m chooses L, l then chooses the low strategy ( sl <  sm) or high strategy ( sl >  sm) that brings it the higher 
profit (  ΠlL or  ΠlḸ ) at the equilibrium. The m profit  ΠmL  follows. In the same way, if m chooses H, there 
follows a profit ΠmH for m. So m will choose the strategy L or H that brings it the higher profit, and so does l.
Of course the complete resolution of the game is very heavy in the general case, due to the nature of the 
indifference level  that is defined through an implicit function. That's the reason we prefer to develop an 
approach aiming to  characterize the different  situations  in the different  quadrants  of  the game,  and the 
conditions relating to the transition from one quadrant to another.
Definition: The dominant user's skill
As seen before, each market in the software industry is characterized by a dominant type of user that we have 
described through a typology as “naive”, “K.M.” or “V.H.” according to their skill level in relation to the 
software product. Of course, this dominant type coexists with users of different skill levels, but the distribution 
can be considered as relatively unimodal. Hence, we characterize the level of the dominant user not through the 
mean value of θ among the population but through a stronger criterion of stochastic dominance, meaning 
that if f and g are the distribution of users’ skills characterizing two markets, then
g >> f ⇔ ∀    ∈  [0,1[ , ∫

١
 g d ∫

١
 f d  (7)
This criterion expresses a shifting of the mass of the users from a lower to a higher level of skills.
In order to understand how and why the dominant user's skill influences the level of investment of the open-
source firm, we study two polar cases. The first (North-West quadrant) is characterized by a low skill level of 
the dominant user, when a large majority of users are concentrated at a low level of skills not far from 0. The 
opposite polar case (South-East quadrant) occurs when the population of users is dominated by highly-skilled 
users.
North-West Quadrant:  sm = sL and sl < sm 
In such a situation, m chooses a low quality while l cannot rely on a potential of users' skills large enough to 
reach a quality level sL without investing in a non-profitable way (assumption (5) on λ value). Then l can only 
aim at a low level of quality and a low price, targeting a demand that is more sensitive to price than to quality.
Proposition 2:
There exists a low threshold of the dominant user's skill under which the open-source firm invests little, 
and stays at a low level of quality, targeting a relatively price-sensitive market.
Proof and technical remarks about proposition 2 are given in the appendix.
The  transition between the two polar  cases  (NW and  SE  quadrants)  when the dominant  user's  skill  is 
increasing can take two different paths: NW→ NE → SE or NW→ SW → SE, depending on the values of the 
parameters.
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South-East Quadrant:  sm = sH and sl > sm
This quadrant corresponds to a  high skill level of the dominant user,  when a  large majority of users are 
concentrated at a high level of skills not far from 1. In such a situation, m will choose a high quality, while l 
can invest in a profitable way by relying on a potential of users' skills large enough to reach a quality level sl > 
sL.
The limit condition is obtained for a symmetrical duopoly situation equivalent to that of the NW case (8) with 
θ0 root of 2 cH θ0 =  sH (1 – F(θ0)) 
and
١
٢∫٠
١
 f d =
s H
cH
−١ (11)
From this stems the following proposition.
Proposition 3:
There exists a high threshold of the dominant user's skill above which the open-source firm invests a 
large and increasing amount,  obtains a high and growing level  of  quality and makes a profit that 
increases with the level of the dominant user's skill.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix.
In conclusion, we can say that if the dominant user is unskilled, and so price-taker, FLOSS may be a good 
strategy if it enables the firm to supply a product at a lower price than the proprietary one, but requiring a low 
level of investment to adapt or improve the FLOSS solution. In the opposite situation, when the dominant user 
is very skilled, an offer based on FLOSS and a high level of complementary services can succeed. This result 
is in accordance with the work of Henkel (2006),  who shows in a  duopoly model that  “a regime with 
compulsory revealing can lead not only to higher profits, but also to higher product qualities than a 
proprietary regime”.  In  the intermediate situations,  the FLOSS  strategy may be less  efficient than the 
proprietary one.
4. Discussion: The critical importance of the users' skills  
How and why may those different users contribute directly or indirectly to FLOSS projects? First  of all, 
contribution  does  not  necessary  imply  code  development  but  can  take  various  forms  in  the  product 
development and improvement. Users have to be considered as valuable “sources of innovation” (Von Hippel), 
not only for  testing and debugging programs but  also for improving product  usability and performances. 
People decide to contribute if they get interested by the product, or if they have a problem, in which case they 
can either report the problem directly (VH users) or through an intermediary, the supplier for instance, that 
allows the user to pass from a passive to an active use of the project.
Empirical observation of firms' involvement in FLOSS development is consistent with the results of the model. 
In fields where the dominant users’ skill is either high or very low, firms invest in FLOSS. When the dominant 
user's skill is intermediate, the dominant design remains that of the classical proprietary model. 
Table 1 below summarizes the main types of users likely to be found in each sub-sector of the IT industry. 
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Table 1. The dominant user type in each IT sub-sector.
Actors/  
products
Dominant user type Comments
Components 
VH
Component producers supply hardware manufacturers, aware of the quality and quality-price aspects of 
the components they will use, as well as the effects of brand reputation of these latter as a signal of quality 
for their own products.
Servers VH The clients are computer-literate people, able to express needs in technical terms, to develop software for 
their own needs, and to innovate by themselves.
High Quality 
Computers 
KM HQC users are somewhat less computer-literate than server users; they can be characterized as “intensive 
frontier users”. So the market is looking at a good performance-to-price ratio.
Low Price 
Computers 
N +. KM  LPC is a mass market; users have no particular skills except in the case of intermediation by a 
“prescriber”.
PCT   N + KM
Players N
PCT and players are relatively mass markets, but some advanced users (more in the PCT field and 
particularly in the PDA market) can play a constructive role in the development of new features. 
Platform 
producers KM + N
For the OS, as for hardware components, most of the end-users buy a computer with an OS already 
installed. So the actual users in our sense of the term are computer manufacturers, service companies and 
sophisticated end-users capable of installing an alternative operating system for their proper use or the use 
of their customers.
On other platforms (database, middleware), the users are also computer manufacturers, service companies 
and highly-skilled users. 
Business 
solution 
producers 
VH/KM depending on the 
markets
In the business solutions market, users are professionals. They are able to make a technical evaluation of 
the product, to carry out trials and tests. This means that people may have skills in the functional domain 
(what they want, how the software works), and sometimes in the technical one (able to adapt or develop 
software to meet their own needs, especially in the tools for computer professionals market).
Architects N (+VH) Large firms and organizations include very sophisticated users (IT division). SMEs or corporate divisions, 
at local or sectorial level, are clients of very heterogeneous but rather low IT skills. However, clients may 
be quite precise in the definition of the services they need, and so in the specification of the application 
characteristics.
1. In the servers market, producers have habitually provided proprietary solutions with proprietary Unix16. 
Here,  suppliers are dealing with highly-skilled VH clients that  can make an essential contribution in the 
context  of  FLOSS  opening. The rise of  PC  servers  has  permitted some users  to  avoid such a  bundling 
problem; moreover, using Linux allows a cheaper offer (vertical advantage) reusing Unix programs (content) 
portfolio. Thus, some firms have been able to widen the servers market from VH users capable of managing 
their systems by themselves to KM clients, sensitive to prices, but also to the quality of a PC server fitted out 
with Linux. So new entries have been experienced like the Cobalt17 one, but  the main actors of the Unix 
“world” have also rapidly developed their own offers, cutting down the sources of vertical differentiation18.
2. In the segment of  low price computers (LPC) where naïve clients are the driving force behind demand, 
competition is overall based on prices. Installing a FLOSS OS can be considered a way to reduce prices and 
hence to extend the firm's market share to a wider market, following Asus' “eee PC” offer, or at least to enable 
a new entry by compensating for not-yet-accessible economies of scale19.
16 See West (2003) for a full discussion of FLOSS strategies in that sector.
17 Cobalt  was  bought  by  SUN,  which  dissolved  the  products  into  its  own  offer.  See 
http://www.sun.com/hardware/serverappliances/eol.html
18 It is worth noting that SUN, on the contrary, being the leader on the UNIX market, has been reluctant to adopt Linux and is today 
the server constructor which has the most difficulties in adapting its business model, with recurrent losses.
19 Since  the  middle  of  2007,  Dell  proposes  Ubuntu  Linux  distribution  on  one  of  its  lowest-price  laptops 
(http://www.dell.com/content/topics/segtopic.aspx/linux_3x?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs), and since 2007 Asus has been selling an 
ultra-portable computer running Linux, called “eee PC”, at less than €300. This has been the “most wanted 2007 Christmas gift”, 
according to the constructor, http://eeepc.asus.com/global/.
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3. Between these two cases there is the high quality computers (HQC) market. HQC producers may find it 
hard to switch from Windows to Linux, because this would mean either acquiring new skills (OS management 
and improvement), or sub-contracting this maintenance to Linux editors (e.g. RedHat or SuSE), which may 
lead to another dependence and to difficult relations with the dominant provider. Nevertheless, a  possible 
future evolution in this sense is likely to arise from the pressure of customers becoming more aware of the 
potentialities of switching to FLOSS,  as  illustrated by Dell's move towards the provision of Linux-based 
computers. In the near future, most of the HQ will probably switch to debundling their machines from the 
associated OS, to give KM users the choice between a Windows and a Linux platform, or to segment more 
their offer between VH users with the Linux offer and KM users with Windows. It is worth noting that in this 
desktop market, the main push in favour of open source, for the time being, is driven by organizations or 
institutions (which we consider as  VH users)  that  take decisions to equip a  large number  of  end-users. 
Examples  are  the  French  “Assemblée Nationale”  (French Congress)  that  has  contracted with a  service 
company to install Linux on all the computers provided to MPs20,  or the initiatives of the Nigerian21 and 
Macedonian22 governments for schools.
4. Personal communication tools represent another intermediate case with less skilled customers (KM+N) 
and a weak degree of involvement on the part  of commercial actors only motivated by preoccupations of 
compatibility and absorptive capacity. There are lots of FLOSS products for PCT, or Mobile Computers23. 
Some are proposed by VH users, other by the constructors. At one extreme, in the games consoles segment but 
also to a lesser extent in the music player market, proprietary formats have introduced, as seen above, a strong 
bundle of hardware-software-content. Thanks to the MP3 standard or new existing or emerging open standards 
like Ogg, new entries are always possible in segments like the music players market, but the main actors, like 
Apple, remain on a strict proprietary strategy. On the contrary, barriers remain high on the video game players 
market due to the scarcity of independent games capable of running on Linux, unlike the PS2, Xbox and other 
proprietary standards games. Moreover, when they exist, such games seem harder to obtain for simple users. 
On the contrary, PCT suppliers have begun experiments with FLOSS products over the last couple of years:
- if the leader, Nokia only sold an Internet tablet based on Linux and a development community24, there are 
lots of open-source projects around Symbian (partly owned by Nokia, partly by Sony-Ericsson)25,  mainly 
dedicated to tools for developing applications (libraries, development tools, etc.) and Samsung proposes the 
first smart phones based on Linux26;
- the PDA Operating system editor Palmsource is working on the integration of its product on a Linux kernel27.
For  the same reasons as  for PC computers,  we hardly see naïve or KM people switch from an installed 
operating system to a FLOSS one. So constructors will continue to drive the market and decide what they 
integrate in their offer. But operating systems are not at the heart of the product differentiation, which is more 
based on ergonomic aspects and hardware characteristics. In the absence of an established de facto standard, 
as it stands in the PC market, Linux is to be considered by PCT suppliers, as it is free of charge and benefits 
from a community of developer-users capable of developing new features and new products outside of any 
proprietary control. Implementing Linux on PCT devices may appear as a good strategy to limit differentiation 
to the core competences of the manufacturers. For firms like Nokia, who do not own or control any operating 
20 http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/software/0,39044164,61970345,00.htm
21 http://www.zdnet.co.uk/talkback/0,1000001161,39290511-39001070c-20088736o,00.htm .
22 http://www.linuxtoday.com/infrastructure/2007091902626NWDPPB
23 See, for instance, http://tuxmobil.org/ a web site dedicated to Linux and mobile computers.
24 Nokia  770  Internet  Tablet:  http://www.nokiausa.com/770/1,7841,feat:1,00.html.  Development  community: 
http://www.maemo.org/
25 In June 2008, Nokia announced to be acquiring the whole share of Symbian and open source it under Eclipse license. See the  
Symbian foundation Web site: http://www.symbianfoundation.org/
26 http://linuxdevices.com/news/NS2854558742.html 
27Palm and  Linux:  http://news.com.com/2102-1041_3-6175171.html?tag=st.util.print.  The  web  site  dedicated  by Palm to open 
source: http://www.palmsource.com/opensource/.
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system, there are strong incentives to use FLOSS. Palm is also a good example of a company that is now 
turning toward Linux, after having sold its OS division.
5. In the software platform market, the Linux distribution market is another very good illustration of the key 
role of the demand. Linux publishers,  like RedHat,  SuSE,  Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft),  have been 
among the first commercial actors to enter the market using FLOSS. This could appear to be obvious on a 
mass market with rather naive users and a significant price-based competition. But today, the retail store sales 
of OS packages represent a negligible part of the revenue of such firms28, and a major part is targeted at the 
business market.
One might explain this by the development of broadband connection, thanks to ADSL. But we believe a more 
important  explanation lies  in  the  skills  of  the  users  and  the  construction of  the  offer.  Consumers  buy 
computers  with an  OS  already installed and  few of  them are  skilled enough to  install  a  different  one. 
Additionally, there are no incentives to do so because the pre-installed OS has already been paid for with the 
computer.  So  the  diffusion  of  FLOSS  OS  on  desktop/laptop  PCs  depends  more  on  the  strategies  of 
constructors, as discussed above, than on direct installation by users. In other words, what needs to be taken 
into account  is  the  possible changing attitude of  computer  producers  towards  the dominant  position of 
Microsoft in the OS market. For VH people wanting to install Linux on their PC, other, more technically 
oriented distributions exist,  like Debian, and there is no need to pay for these distributions, available for 
download on the Web.
On the emerging OS for PC server market, things work differently. Most of the users, of VH or KM type, are 
aware of the technical questions involved in installing and configuring an OS.  It  is also easier to buy a 
machine without an operating system installed, and the relative price of the OS is lower. FLOSS gives these 
users access to a cheaper, more open and more adaptable Unix-like operating system than they could find in 
the traditional Unix offer. This gave FLOSS OS publishers an undeniable competitive advantage, at least until 
server constructors started to offer PC servers with Linux.
6. In the business software market, the more skilled the users are in terms of software development skills and 
(although this  is  a  lesser driving force) in terms of expressing their functionality requirements,  the more 
FLOSS concepts and related industrial offers are likely to spread. 
It is clear that the use of open-source business software, enabling savings on the cost of licenses, offers a price 
advantage. Moreover, the fact that the customer can evaluate the product without buying a license is also an 
advantage in terms of dissemination. It may even be compulsory when dominant players already exist on the 
market (such as the database market where MySQL proposes software products competing against those of 
Oracle, IBM and Microsoft,  who represent more than 80 % of the market) or when customers are highly 
sensitive to  price  (such  as  the ERP  market  which increasingly concerns  SMEs  and where open-source 
products like ERP5 or tiny ERP are now available). This strategy also enables the association of a corporate 
brand  with  a  product,  therefore  increasing  the  notoriety  of  the  firm through  distribution  of  the  latter. 
Moreover, on these technical markets, especially when the customers are developers, availability of the code 
promotes  cooperation.  The  producer  approves  the  contributions,  ensures  stability  of  the  tool  and  helps 
developers  to  use  it.  If  some  individual  contributor  becomes  important  (in  terms  of  contribution 
volume/quality/innovative aspect), s/he may be hired by a producer, with reduced recruitment costs and risks 
(ACT, MySQL and some small service companies are using this method). By contributing to innovation, the 
developers (and possibly companies using the tool) are therefore guaranteed that their needs will be taken into 
account  more quickly and integrated into the product  (which is  a  fundamental  factor  in reducing costs, 
according to Von Hippel 1988). 
Obviously, capitalizing on existing products is more difficult, even if, as Muselli (2002) explained, with entire 
control of the software, a dual license strategy can be set up to sell the program when requested by customers 
(because, for example, they want to integrate it in a larger, closed package). This is what companies like Qt or 
MySQL offer. But, today, the main source of revenue again comes from services, more precisely what we call 
28 RedHat  stopped this  activity (see  financial  report  2006,  p.  31); the  consumer market  (including distributors,  OEM sales,  e-
commerce and Club) represented 2.54M€ (45% of the total earnings) showing a 23.4% decrease for Mandriva in the 2005-2006 
fiscal year; SuSE has been bought by Novell, so these revenues are diluted.
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the “3A services” (assistance,  assurance and adaptation to  use).  Otherwise,  adaptation services must  be 
significant enough to finance development of the product. Therefore, the objective is to transform a handicap 
(significant investments) into a commercial advantage, by increasing the business feedback from users and by 
considering openness as a way to reduce transaction costs and as a signal of quality. Currently, the main 
evolution  for  those  firms  is  to  switch  from  a  demand  pull  strategy  (functionalities  are  developed  to 
stimulate/create the demand) to an 'on-demand' development (development when required and paid for  or 
carried out by the users).
This  explains  why  open-source  business  products  are  developed mainly  in  “business”  software  (ERP, 
computer infrastructure software such as compilers), where users ready to pay for configuration, maintenance 
or assistance services are numerous. But the scope could easily extend to many technical/professional software 
activities.
7. As far as the architects market is concerned, as Horn (2004) points out, assembling components requires 
access to the source codes (problem of compatibility), and their adaptation to different needs (of users and 
other  components).  They must  therefore  be  available  in  the  form of  open-source  software  and  legally 
modifiable.
The competitive advantage in using free software, in addition to price, is therefore the ability to offer an 
assembled set  of components with greater  interoperability,  which should increase the quality of the final 
product, on a market where the quality of services is one of the recurrent problems (see De Bandt, 1995). 
Revenues are  generated by assembling and adaptation services, as  is  the case for  any traditional service 
company.
The only uncertainty about the model concerns the availability of the components: who will develop them and 
who will  maintain  them? Moreover,  the  customers  of  these  companies  may  already have  (proprietary) 
programs installed that need to be taken into account. In the end, an open-source strategy could even be a 
guarantee of means (maximum use of free software),  but  not a  guarantee of the results (use of only free 
software), unless the customer requests this, since in this situation he keeps the last word.
Two kinds of firms use FLOSS today: newcomers who specialize in FLOSS architecture, using FLOSS as a 
vertical (price) and horizontal differentiation asset, and incumbents, such as IBM for its service activities29. 
Traditional service firms like Cap Gemini are more agnostic with regard to the technologies used and the 
intellectual property regime involved. They will generally follow the customers’ demand, which depends on 
their  ability  to  keep  up  with  the  development  of  the  project.  These  customers  are  most  often  large 
organisations, skilled computer users that  are receptive to the opportunity to integrate the most advanced 
software components, developed under open licenses. So they are becoming increasingly involved in FLOSS 
as the market grows and matures 30. 
5. Conclusion  
In application markets, all the recent new entries have been based on the competitive advantage drawn from 
the FLOSS  label:  FLOSS  OS  publishers  (like RedHat),  FLOSS  database  producers  (MySQL),  FLOSS 
service companies (VA Linux, or Linagora in France).
Today, incumbents are also adopting this strategy (IBM with Eclipse, SAP opening its database system, even 
Microsoft  opening some of  its  technical  tools.)  This  could shortly  become the benchmark  of  industrial 
organization on these markets, inducing a growing control of FLOSS development by commercial firms and a 
spectacular extension of open IP regimes in the software field.
In such conditions, the open IP regime can be seen as a very efficient solution to the Schumpeterian dilemma, 
insofar as it permits a wide diffusion of knowledge, while encouraging innovation, as producers are incited to 
contribute to the development of the product they use/sell.
29 As  explained  by  Slatter  (1992),  one  of  the  main  strategies  for  newcomers  in  technological  markets  is  technological 
differentiation. Basing its offer on new FLOSS products can be seen as a way for new service companies to differentiate.
30 In 2005, Gartner forecasted that « 2008, 95 percent of Global 2000 organizations will have formal open-source acquisition and 
management strategies » (http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?doc_cd=125868)
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Nevertheless, the origin of the open-source rationale remains that of developer-users pooling their development 
efforts for their own needs, aiming at better access to efficient tools for everyone. This is the core of the open-
source model and, as seen in the paper, the recent move towards commercial structuring doesn’t contradict this 
foundation. But, as seen before, it is clear that things function differently according to the place and type of the 
users in the different markets of the IT industry. As we have stressed, users play a critical role in the design of 
FLOSS strategies in the various market segments, both in the formation and specification of the demand and in 
their capacity to produce efficient feedbacks that contribute to raising the quality level of the products.
For a better understanding of how this works in a competitive context, we have developed a small competition 
model in which one open-source software provider competes with one proprietary software firm. We have 
focused on two polar  market situations driven by contrasting distributions of skills among users.  At one 
extreme, users are concentrated at a very low level of skills. There are no significant feedback effects and the 
open-source software firm, like the proprietary one, remains at a low level of product quality, is little involved 
in product development and finds a competitive advantage in terms of price. At the other extreme, the more 
skilled the users, the higher the quality level of the open-source product, the more the open source firms invests 
and makes profits. The two opposite situations show how involvement of commercial firms in FLOSS is not 
contradictory with the essence of open-source rationale and can combine with the way communities operate to 
achieve the viability of an alternative economic model based on open knowledge.
The FLOSS  movement has  sometimes been presented as  a  canonical  model of  production for  the open 
innovation paradigm, and even for the knowledge society. If so, open development may develop in fields where 
users are skilled enough to initiate the development of open knowledge and have enough market power to force 
the traditional producers to shift to an open model. Open initiatives have been launched in many industries, 
such as biotech, remote sensing and chip design. Most of the time, their chances of success are evaluated in 
terms of the motivation of the participants and the stability of the “community”. Our contribution argues for 
more economic aspects of the evaluation, by taking into account the impact of the users in these productions, 
and their bargaining power.   
.Appendix  
● Proof of the proposition 1
θ adopts the open source software if and only if Ul (θ ) > Um (θ ) 
⇔ sl θ - pl > sm θ - pm
when sl < sm  (and pl < pm )
⇔ 
p m− pl
sm−s l
which remains true for any θ' < θ
and symmetrically for  sl > sm  

 Proof and technical remarks about the proposition 2
The situation described in the N-W quadrant will hold as long as l does not catch up m at level sL  , then as 
long as  λ cl  (1+ τl )  < sL  .
At the limit, when sl  = sL  = sm  , the two firms have to sell at the same price and profit 0, sharing the market 
equally.
So the demand for each of the firms can be written
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d =١
٢∫ ٠
١
f d =١
٢
[١−F ٠] (8)
where θ0 = sL / p and p= cL / d  (the profit of m is equal to zero) 
so as θ0 is the root of  2 cL θ0 =  sL (1 – F(θ0)).
The profit of l is equal to zero so that Πl = d p - cl   ⇔  cl = cL 
The condition sl  = sL can then be written as a condition on the users feedback
l=
١
٢∫٠
١
 f d =
sL
c L
−١ (9)
Where θ0 has been defined above.

Of course, we have only focused here on the limit conditions.
Note that ( sL  , sL ) is never a Nash stable equilibrium. At the equilibrium l always chooses  sl  < sL so as to 
avoid Bertrand competition. 
For a given distribution f of the users' skills, if l has only quality aims, it can reach
s l=Max l٠ sl  so that  l s l=٠ .
When l, as commercial competing firm, aims to maximise its profit, it chooses
sl*  = Arg Max Π l  ( sl ) / sl  ∈ ] 0 , s l [
With a critical distribution fc when l choosing sl  = sL , neither l nor m would make any profit.
So to maximize its profit level, l will choose sl*  < s l
c < sL , so that l and m make positive profits.
Depending on the value of λ, the above threshold can be more or less high. It is decreasing with λ and cL  and 
increasing with sL . It is then also possible that m decides to choose the high quality before l has been capable 
to catch up. This will happen as soon as the expected profit for m with a low strategy for l is greater for a high 
than for a low quality.
The limit condition is obtained with equal profits, so that
[١−F  L] p L−cL=[١−F  H ] pH−cH (10)
which also depends on the differential  cH - cL  .
 Proof of the proposition 3
When f dominates the condition (11) above, l and m target high quality products. So m chooses sm = sH  at cost 
cH and l invests cl and targets a quality sl > sH   with sl = λ cl  (1+ τl )  
where l=∫

١
 f d   and =
p l− p m
s l−s H
At prices  pl and pm are such that  pl > pm . The payoffs can then be written
 l=[١−F  ] p l−c l  and
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m=[F  −F ٠
m] p m−cH  where ٠
m=
pm
sH
We assume that the user base improves its aggregate skill level following the criterion of stochastic dominance 
(7) shifting from a distribution f to a distribution g such that
∀    ∈  [0,1[ ,  ∫

١
 g d ∫

١
 f d 
The consequences of such a shift is above all and by definition a growth of the users' feedback from any 
population [  , 1] ,  ∀    ∈  [0,1[ . Ιmproving sl tends to lower, ceteris paribus, the level of the indifferent 
user  , enlarge the l market base, increase its profit and enable it to lower its price p l  and to reinforce its 
level of investment  cl  then reinforcing again the quality level sl until reaching a new competitive   equilibrium 
( sl g , sH )  where sl g
 
> sl .

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